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In this paper we investigate the contribution of di¤erent sources of tech-
nology to productivity growth in three leading economies, Japan, Germany
and the United States, for the period 1977-2005 using a general equilibrium
approach. We use a dynamic general equilibrium growth model calibrated
with data from the EU-KLEMS database. Sources of technological change
to productivity are decomposed into neutral and investment-speci…c change
from di¤erent capital assets. Capital is disaggregated into three assets:
structures, non-ICT equipment and ICT equipment.
According to the neoclassical growth model, long run productivity growth
can only be driven by the state of technology. Here we adopt the view that
the progress of technology can be due to two complementary sources: neu-
tral progress and investment-speci…c progress. While the former is associ-
ated with multifactor productivity, the latter is the amount of technology
that can be acquired by using one unit of a particular physical capital asset.
Investment-speci…c technology can widely vary from one asset to an-
other. Indeed recent typologies recommend using disaggregated measures
of capital, as for instance, structures and equipment. Equipment is in turn
divided into information and communication technologies (ICT) equipment,
i.e. hardware, software and communication networks, and non-ICT equip-
ment, i.e. machinery, transport equipment. The amount of technology incor-
porated in a computer, for instance, is much higher than that in a non-ICT
asset. As pointed out by Jorgenson (2002), this technological progress can
be observed in improvements in performance, rather than a decline in the
nominal price of the capital assets. In nominal terms, the price of a per-
sonal computer has changed very little in the last decade. But in real terms,
when quality is also controlled for (in terms of processing units), the price
has decreased by more than 25 percent by year.1 The decay in the price
in the rest of capital assets has been moderately smaller but also re‡ects
an implicit technological progress. Thus both the acquisition prices and the
rental prices of capital equipment have decreased in the last …fteen years.
Several recent studies have stressed the importance of the ICT as a key
factor behind the upsurge in the U.S. productivity after 1995 (see among
others, Collechia and Schreyer, 2001; Stiroh, 2002; Jorgenson, 2002). With
regards to Europe, E.U. countries fall well below the United States in terms
of ICT penetration (Timmer and van Ark, 2005). Whereas there exist a huge
1Jorgenson (2002), for instance, pointed out that a 2005 typical personal computer is








literature for the case of the U.S. economy, the literature is relatively scarce
for the cases of Japan and Germany. In the case of the European economies
a relevant analysis is Inklaar, McGukin and van Ark (2005), which show
that total factor productivity growth in Germany since the mid 1990s has
been much slower than in the U.S., especially in market services.
Of particular interest is the case of Japan. Hayashi and Prescott (2002)
calibrate a simple neoclassical growth model for the Japanese economy show-
ing that the economic downturn during the 1990s can be explained by a slow-
down in Total Factor Productivity (TFP). Braun and Shioji (2007) have ex-
tended this and found that economic growth in the lost decade was mainly
due to investment-speci…c technological change. Additionally, Jorgenson
and Motohashi (2005) study the role of ICT on economic growth in Japan
and the United States. They show that the contribution of ICT to economic
growth in Japan after 1995 was similar to that of the U.S. and that more
than a half of Japanese output growth from the mid 1990s can be attributed
to information technology. These authors conducted a simulation exercise
on potential output growth in Japan and the U.S. until 2013, predicting
that economic growth in Japan will continue to lag behind the U.S. but that
labor productivity growth in both economies will be similar. More recently,
Fueki and Kawamoto (2008) use a standard growth accounting approach
to obtain that the TFP growth in Japan has been con…ned to the ICT
production sector since 2000. Fukao and Miyagawa (2007), also using the
EU-KLEMS database, make a comparison between Japan and the mayor
E.U. countries and the U.S. As in the mayor European countries, Japan
experienced a slowdown in TFP growth after 1995 of a similar magnitude.
The comparison of the technological progress in these economies is par-
ticularly interesting for several reasons. First, they are the three leading
economies in the world and their dynamics are taken as a reference of the
overall world economic moment. Second, the economic performance has
been di¤erent in each of these three countries, especially during the last
decade. As we will see, while the Japanese economy has experienced a
slowdown in the growth of its productivity during the nineties, the U.S.
economy has seen an upsurge of productivity ever since, and German pro-
ductivity growth has evolved within a more stable pattern. As shown by
Fukao and Miyagawa (2007), real GDP growth in Japan during the period
1995-2004 did not exceed 1%, much lower than the 3.3% of output growth
in the period 1973-1995. This sharply contrasts with the performance of the
European economies and the U.S. economy. Third, it is expected that ICT
plays a key role in the economic growth as in these economies the ratio of








to quantify the size of this contribution.
Our results show some important di¤erences in the performance among
these economies. We …nd that neutral technological change is the driving
source of productivity in Japan and Germany, accounting for about 70-75%
of the growth in Japan and about 85% of the growth in Germany. For
the U.S. economy, the main source of productivity derives from investment-
speci…c technological change, mainly associated with ICT. The contribu-
tion to average productivity growth from investment-speci…c technological
change is around 0.35 percentage points for Germany and around 0.65 per-
centage points for Japan whereas it is about 0.70 percentage points for the
U.S. The main …nding of the paper is that the importance of ICT technologi-
cal progress in explaining productivity growth shows considerable di¤erences
across countries. ICT technological progress contribution to average produc-
tivity growth is only about 0.25 percentage points for Germany, around 0.45
percentage points for Japan and 0.65 percentage points for the U.S.
Finally, we study the e¤ects of the three di¤erent technological change
in the short-run. Whereas a neutral technological shocks has a positive
impact on productivity growth, investment-speci…c technological shock to
both ICT and non-ICT equipment have a negative, although small, impact
on productivity growth. This is caused by the fact that an investment-
speci…c technological shock has a higher impact on hours than on output.
Additionally, speci…c technological shocks also have a negative impact on
consumption growth and a positive impact on investment growth. We obtain
that most of the variability of productivity in the short-run can be attributed
to neutral shocks.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present a theo-
retical dynamic general equilibrium growth model with embodied technolog-
ical progress and the characterization of its balanced growth path. Section
3 presents a description of the data set and the calibration exercise. Section
4 presents the estimation of the contribution of each type of technological
change to labor productivity growth in the long-run. Section 5 focuses on
the e¤ects of di¤erent technological shocks in the short-run. Finally, Section
6 presents some concluding remarks.
2 The model
Following Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (1997) we use a dynamic gen-
eral equilibrium neoclassical growth model in which two key elements are








nological change speci…c to the production of each type of capital. We use
a simpli…cation of the model developed in Martínez, Rodríguez and Tor-
res (2008) which, in turn, is an extension of the Greenwood et al. (1997)
model, but distinguish between non-ICT and ICT equipment capital assets.
Thus, while Greenwood et al. (1997) disaggregate between structures and
equipment, we distinguish among three di¤erent types of capital inputs.
Output is therefore produced as a combination from four inputs: L is labor
in hours worked; Kstr, non residential structures; Knict, non-ICT equipment
and Kict, ICT equipment.
Households. The economy is inhabited by an in…nitely lived, repre-
sentative agent of household who has time-separable preferences in terms of










where ￿ is the discount factor, E0 is the conditional expectation operator at
time 0, and ￿ 2 (0;1) is the participation of consumption on total income.
Private consumption is denoted by Ct: Leisure is Ot = NtH ￿ Lt; where H
is the number of e¤ective hours in the year, times population in the age of
taking labor-leisure decisions (Nt), minus the aggregated number of hours
worked a year (Lt = Ntht, with ht representing annual hours worked per
worker).
The budget constraint faced by the consumer says that consumption and
investment cannot exceed the sum of labor and capital rental income net of
taxes and lump-sum transfers:
(1 + ￿c)Ct + Istr;t + Inict;t + Iict;t (2)
= Tt + (1 ￿ ￿`)WtLt
+(1 ￿ ￿k)(Rstr;tKstr;t + Rnict;tKnict;t + Rict;tKict;t);
where Tt is the transfer received by consumers from the government, Wt is
the wage, Ri;t is the rental price of asset type i, and ￿c;￿`;￿k, are the con-
sumption tax, the labor income tax and the capital income tax, respectively.
Capital holdings evolve according to:
Knict;t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿nict)Knict;t + Qnict;tInict;t; (3)
Kict;t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿ict)Kict;t + Qict;tIict;t; (4)








where ￿i is the depreciation rate. Qi;t determines the amount of asset of asset
i 2 fnict;ictg than can be purchased by one unit of output, representing
the current state of technology for producing capital i. In the standard
neoclassical one-sector growth model Qi;t = 1 for all t. In our model Qi;t may
increase or decrease over time depending on the type of capital we consider,
representing technological change speci…c to the production of each capital.
In fact, an increase in Qi;t lowers the average cost of producing investment
goods in units of …nal good. Notice that expression (5) implies the standard
assumption where there is no investment-speci…c technological change in
structures.2
The problem faced by the consumer is to choose a sequence Ct, Ot, and
It to maximize the utility (1), subject to the budget constraints (2) and
the laws of motion (3)-(5), given taxes f￿c;￿k;￿`g and the initial conditions
Ki;0, for i 2 fstr;nict;ictg.
Firms. The problem of …rms is to …nd optimal values for the utilization
of labor and the di¤erent types of capital. The production of …nal output
Y requires the services of labor L and the services of three types of capital
Ki, i 2 fstr;nict;ictg. The …rm rents capital and employs labor in order to
maximize pro…ts at period t, taking factor prices as given. The technology









where At is total factor productivity and where 0 ￿ ￿i < 1, i 2 fstr;nict;ictg,
and
￿str + ￿nict + ￿ict < 1;
￿L + ￿str + ￿nict + ￿ict = 1:
Final output can be used for four purposes: consumption or investment in
three types of capital,
Yt = Ct + Istr;t + Inict;t + Iict;t (7)
Both output and investment are measured in units of consumption.
Technological progress. The forms of technological progress under
consideration fAt;Qnict;t;Qnict;tg evolve according to the following motions:
Qi;t = Qi;0￿t
i exp(ui;t); (8)
ui;t = ￿iui;t￿1 + "i;t; (9)
2Gort, Greenwood and Rupert (1999) estimate that the NIPA price for nonresidential








for i 2 fnict;ictg, and
At = A0gt
A exp(uA;t); (10)
uA;t = ￿AuA;t￿1 + "A;t; (11)


















This means that these processes are the sum of a trend, with gross growth
rates f￿nict;￿ict;gAg, and a cycle around, represented by ui;t. The fundamen-
tal shock "i;t has a transitory impact on the level of the cyclical component
ui;t, whose persistency is given by f￿nict;￿ict;￿Ag, all belonging to the unit
circle.
Government. Finally, we consider the existence of a tax-levying gov-
ernment in order to take into account the e¤ects of taxation on capital
accumulation. The government taxes consumption and income from labor
and capital. We assume that the government balances its budget period-
by-period by returning revenues from distortionary taxes to the agents via
lump-sum transfers Tt:
￿cCt + ￿`WtLt + ￿k (Rstr;tKstr;t + Rnict;tKnict;t + Rict;tKict;t) = Tt: (14)
Equilibrium. The following expressions summarize the …rst order con-


























































for i 2 fstr;nict;ictg. The condition (15) equates the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and leisure to the opportunity cost of
one additional unit of leisure. Conditions (16)-(18) mean that the inter-
temporal marginal rate of consumption equates the after-tax rates of return
of the three investment assets. Finally, conditions (19) and (20) mean that
the …rm hires capital and labor so that the marginal contribution of these
factors must equate their competitive rental prices.
Additionally, the economy must satisfy the feasibility constraint:
Ct + Istr;t + Inict;t + Iict;t (21)
= Rstr;tKstr;t + Rnict;tKnict;t + Rict;tKict;t + WtLt = Yt
First order conditions for the household (15) and (16), together with
the …rst order conditions of the …rm (19) and (20), the budget constraint
of the government (14), and the feasibility constraint of the economy (21),
characterize a competitive equilibrium for the economy.
The balanced growth path. The steady state is an equilibrium sat-
isfying the above conditions such that all variables grow at a constant rate.
Given the assumption of no unemployment, total hours worked grow by the
population growth rate, which is assumed to be zero. Output, consumption
and investment must all grow at the same rate, which is denoted by g. How-
ever, the di¤erent types of capital would grow at a di¤erent rate depending
on the evolution of their relative prices. From the production function (6)







where gA is the steady state exogenous growth of At. Let us denote gi as the
steady state growth rate of capital i 2 fstr;nict;ictg. Then, from the laws
of motion (3)-(5) we have that the growth of each capital input is given by:
gi = ￿ig; (23)
with i 2 fnict;ictg and gstr = g, given the assumption of no speci…c tech-
nological progress for structures.
Therefore, the long run growth rate of output can be accounted for by
neutral technological progress and by increases in the capital stock. In
addition, expression (23) says that the capital stock growth also depends
on the technology producing the capital goods. Therefore, it is possible

















ict | {z }
Investment-speci…c
: (24)
Expression (24) implies that the log of output growth can be decomposed as
a linear combination of both progresses. Growth rate of each capital asset
can be di¤erent, depending on the relative price of the new capital in terms
of output.

























for i 2 fstr;nict;ictg, where the time subscript has been suppressed for
simplicity.
Using these ratios, the balanced growth path can be characterized as
g
￿
￿i = (1 ￿ ￿k)￿i
Y Qi
Ki









+ 1 ￿ ￿i; (27)
for i 2 fnict;ictg, and for structures:
g
￿
= (1 ￿ ￿k)￿str
Y
Kstr














































3 Data and parameters
From the EU-KLEMS Database3 we retrieve (nominal and real) series of
gross output, investment, compensation of inputs, capital assets and labor in
hours worked for Japan, the U.S. and Germany.4 We use observations from
1977 to 2005 for the three countries. Data are available from 1970 to 1990
only for West Germany, and from 1991 to 2005 for reuni…ed Germany. We
use data for West Germany to construct series of prices (implicit de‡ators)
for investment assets and for 1977-1990. EU-KLEMS also provides complete
series of gross output and total hours worked in Germany from 1970 to 2005.
As regards series of capital, we calculate growth rates of the di¤erent assets
from 1977 to 1990 using data from West Germany. These series are then
linked to the growth rates from 1991 to 2005 using the data from reuni…ed
Germany.
We use a Törnqvist index to construct aggregate series for Non-ICT and
ICT capital stock and investment that take account of the variation in rel-
ative prices of assets. For all the cases, the aggregated capital stock and
their implicit de‡ators are computed. Non-ICT series are the aggregation
of machinery and other equipment, transport equipment and other assets.
ICT series are the aggregation of hardware, communication equipment and
software. Structures only include non-residential constructions, that is, res-
idential capital has been excluded.
Table 1 presents average labor productivity growth rates for several pe-
riods. Labor is measured in hours worked. On average for the period 1977-
2005, according to EU-KLEMS data, the Japanese economy evinces the
highest productivity growth rate with 2.90%. This is followed by Germany
with 2.32% and the U.S. with 1.44%. The evolution of productivity over
time has a di¤erent lecture: it is decreasing in Japan, increasing in the U.S.
and (reasonably) stable in Germany. The Japanese growth rate during 2000-
2005 is almost half as high as the growth rate during the nineties, while the
U.S. growth rate in 2000-2005 is about double that of the nineties. However,
average productivity growth in Japan during the period 2000-2005 is similar
to average U.S. productivity growth and higher than in Germany for the
same period. This upsurge in the U.S. productivity has been associated to
the use of ICT assets (see, among others, Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000, and
Jorgenson, 2001). With regards to Japanese rates, a similar albeit more
dramatic contraction in productivity growth is also documented in Hayashi
3See http://www.euklems.net/
4Fukao and Miyagawa (2007) also use the EU-KLEMS Database to analyze the sources








and Prescott (2002), using growth per person aged 20-69, instead of hours
worked.
In order to conduct the calibration of the model we need to assign values

















Table 2 shows the selected values for this set of parameters. The …rst row
presents …gures for the gross productivity growth, g, for the three countries,
and are backed by the results in table 1. Following is the fraction of hours
worked over total hours, L=(NH). This fraction goes from 29% in Germany
to 36% in Japan and the U.S. In the case of Japan, this ratio has been
decreasing from 42% in 1977, up to a stable value of 35% by the midle of
the nineties (see Hayashi and Prescott, 2002). This decrease is related to
institutional reforms in the labor market, that have limited the workweek
since the late eighties. For the case of the U.S., this ratio is very stable using
the EU-KLEMS data. Greenwood et al. (1997, 2000) instead use a value of
L=(NH) = 0:24 for the U.S. economy.
The EU-KLEMS data base provides estimated series of labor compensa-
tion and capital compensation that allow us to construct an estimate of the
labor cost share parameter ￿L, as the ratio of labor compensation over total
costs. The compensation to the services from residential capital has been
excluded. These cost shares ￿L are between two thirds and three quarters.
For the U.S. and Germany, these shares are consistent with those provided
by Gollin (2002), who estimates that the income share should be within the
[0.65,0.80] interval in a wide set of countries under consideration. Particu-
larly, for the U.S. economy, Gollin estimates a band of [0.664, 0.773], that
catches our prior guess of ￿L = 0:7248. This value is reasonably close to
￿L = 0:7 as proposed by Greenwood et al. (1997, 2000) or Pakko (2005)
in similar calibrations. However, for the case of Japan, Gollin’s estimate is
[0.692, 0.727], while we use a value of ￿L = 0:6387, using the EU-KLEMS
data set. Hayashi and Prescott (2002) estimate a value ￿L = 0:638, using
data from national accounts and Input-Output matrices, which is exactly
equal to the value we use.
Depreciation rates are estimated using the three aggregated series of
capital. These estimates are similar but not identical across countries, as
shown in table 2. Given that we are using aggregate series of capital, the








other country. This produces di¤erent estimates of the depreciation rate.5
Structures depreciate by 2.8% a year on average. This rate contrasts with
that assumed by Greenwood et al. (1997) of 5.6%. The rates of depreciation
are much higher in the case of the of ICT equipment, [18%,22%], and the
one of non-ICT assets, around 12%.
Table 2 also reports the investment weights as the ratio of nominal in-
vestment in asset i over total nominal investment expenditure that we label
by !i. According to the notation in (25), note that Ii=Y = (1 ￿ C=Y )!i,
and
P
i !i = 1. Non-ICT assets have the highest weight, specially in Japan
and Germany, 47%. The U.S. economy has invested about a 25% from total
nominal investment in ICT assets. This weight is sensibly higher than those
of Japan and Germany, 15%.
Prices Qit represent the amount of asset i that can be purchased by
one unit of output at time t, Qit = Pt=qit, where Pt is the implicit de‡ator
of gross output, and qit is the implicit de‡ator of asset i calculated as the
ratio of nominal to real investment. Table 2 reports the average gross price
changes of the three assets for the three countries:
￿i = T￿1 X
t
Qit=Qit￿1:
Price variations ￿i are similar in the U.S. and Germany. The change in
the price of non ICT equipment is 0.4% in the U.S. and Germany. In the
case of Japan, this variation is 1%. The amount of ICT equipment that can
be purchased by one unit of output has increased by 9% per year in the U.S.
and Germany, and 6.3% per year in Japan. Investment-speci…c technological
change, as measured by the evolution of the Qi, is thereby stronger for ICT
equipment.
A common practice in this type of exercises is to use the quality ad-
justed price series of the capital equipment estimated by Gordon (1990),
later extended by Cummnis and Violante (2002), as a proxy for the invest-
ment speci…c technological change. For the U.S. data, the EU KLEMS base
makes use of the NIPA prices. The equipment de‡ator could still be biased
with respect to those of Gordon-Cummins-Violante. This problem was es-
pecially severe in the years prior to 1982, when the share of investment in
quality-adjusted equipment was small. As long as we focus on the period
5Depreciation rates provided by EU-KLEMS are the same for all countries but can vary
depending on the sector. These are: [2.3%, 5.1%] for non residential structures; [9.2%,
22.9%] for transport equipment; [9.4%, 14.9%] for other machinery and other assets; 31.5%








1977-2005, we consider that the NIPA prices correctly re‡ect the investment-
speci…c technological change for equipment in the U.S. Accordingly, as long
as Germany and Japan have also incorporated these hedonic techniques, we
consider that these prices are valid measures that adjust their equipment
assets for quality. The evolution of the levels of the Qi;t’s are depicted in
…gure 1 (base year is 1995). As can be observed, the implicit change for
non-ICT equipment shows a slightly upward trend. We also observe a sig-
ni…cant upward trend in the case of the implicit change of ICT equipment,
mainly due to implicit change associated to hardware equipment.
Finally, in order to take into account the distortionary e¤ects of taxes,
particularly on capital accumulation, realistic measures of tax rates are
needed. In this paper we use the e¤ective average tax rates, estimated
by Boscá, García and Taguas (2008), who follow the methodology proposed
by Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994). To that end, table 2 presents average
values for the period 1980-2005. Tax structure is similar in Japan and the
U.S., where labor income taxes are higher than capital income taxes. In
Germany, the consumption tax rates doubles those of Japan and the U.S.,
but the labor income tax is higher than the capital income tax.
[Tables 1 and 2 and …gure 1 here]
Model evaluation. In order to evaluate the empirical relevance of our
model, simulated productivity growth are compared to the observed produc-
tivity growth year-by-year. Using a log-linear version of the model, …gure 2
plots the observed productivity growth and the calibrated one derived from
the model for the three countries. Series of Qi;t and At are taken as granted.
As we can observe, the calibrated model does a good job of explaining move-
ments in labor productivity growth. This means that our model is able to
replicate not only the long-run behavior of productivity growth in the three
countries, but also short-run ‡uctuations in labor productivity growth. The
correlation coe¢cients of the observed productivity growths and those gen-
erated by the model are 0.8693 for Japan, 0.8722 for the U.S., and 0.8542 for
Germany. For the U.S. economy we observe some di¤erences in the period
1981-1985, with observed productivity growth larger than the predicted one.
We conclude that the model can replicate productivity growth both in the










In this section we calibrate the contribution of investment-speci…c techno-
logical progress to long-run productivity growth. We follow the approach
proposed by Greenwood et al. (1997), but incorporating the new element in-
cluded in our model: investment-speci…c technological progress from the two
equipment capital assets considered. Therefore, we can decompose long-run
productivity growth into three di¤erent technological factors.
This calculation is given by expression (24), that relates the long run
productivity growth to both neutral progress and investment speci…c tech-
nological progress. On the other hand, we exploit the system of nine steady


















given the set of parameters ￿ in (33) as reported in table 2. Once techno-
logical parameters ￿i, i 2 fstr;nict;ictg, are calibrated, we use the series of
output, capital and labor in hours worked to calculate residually the total
factor productivity. This gives an estimation of the neutral change that,
added to the speci…c change, produces a calibrated value of productivity
growth according to (24).
Notice that table 2 proposes a vector of investment weights for the port-
folio of physical assets, labeled as !i. The investment-saving rate on asset
i would be given by Ii=Y = (1 ￿ C=Y )!i, and the total investment-saving
rate is (1 ￿ C=Y ). In order to calibrate the steady state value of this rate,
we need an additional equation that …xes the after-tax return rate of cap-
ital to some value. This can be done by using equation (26). The right
hand side of this expression is the real (after-tax) rate of return on asset
i 2 fstr;nict;ictg, that in equilibrium should equal the stationary marginal
rate of substitution between future and present consumption, as given by
g=￿. Expression (26) is therefore an arbitrage condition that imposes that
the return of the di¤erent assets must be equal to g=￿. For example, Green-
wood et al. (1997, 2000) use a 7% rate, g=￿ = 1:07 for their long run
analysis, and a 4% rate, g=￿ = 1:04, for their short run analysis. Pakko
(2005) uses a rate of 6%. Hayashi and Prescott (2002) calculate that the
after tax rate of return has decreased from 6.1% in the eighties until 4.2%
at the end of the nineties. In this paper, in order to overcome the uncer-
tainty associated to this rate, we will calibrate the parameters of the model








and calibrate a stationary saving rate consistent with these values.
Tables 3, 4 and 5 summarize the results obtained from the calibrated
decomposition exercise for the three countries.
Japan. Results are reported in table 3. The calibrated value of pro-
ductivity growth is reasonably close to the observed one and seems to be
robust to the assumed after tax return rate on capital. Neutral change
produces increases in productivity between 1.63% and 1.72%, while implicit
technological change produces changes from 0.70% to 0.61%. Therefore, neu-
tral technological change accounts for around 70% of productivity growth.
The remaining 30% is accounted for by the investment-speci…c technolog-
ical change. ICT equipment provides most of this contribution, from 50%
to 44%, whereas contribution from non-ICT equipment is around 18%. The
calibrated saving rate moves within an interval from 16% to 20.0%. Esti-
mated technological parameters are also provided in the subsequent lines
of the table. Hayashi and Prescott (2002) estimate a discount factor for
Japan of ￿ = 0:976 and Hayashi and Nomura (2005) use a value of 0.964.
Our benchmark model produces these same discount factors for an after-tax
discount rate of 6-7%, with a stationary investment rate of 16-17%.
Miyagawa, Ito and Harada (2004) study the contribution of ICT invest-
ment to productivity growth in Japan at an industry level. These authors
decompose labor productivity growth into intra-sectoral capital deepening,
e¢ciency e¤ects of capital deepening, e¢ciency e¤ects of labor shifts, and
intra-sectoral TFP growth, showing that the productivity slowdown in the
1990s was caused by the reduction in the e¢ciency e¤ects of labor shifts.
Shinjo and Zhang (2003), estimating the marginal Tobin’s q-ratios of ICT
capital, show the existence of an overinvestment in ICT capital relative
to non-ICT capital in the U.S., but the opposite in the case of Japan.
Tokui, Inui and Kim (2008) analyze embodied technological progress in the
Japanese economy using …rm-level data. These authors estimate a pro-
duction function with several control variables accounting for technological
progress, obtaining that the average rate of technological progress embodied
in machinery and equipment is between 0.2 and 0.4 percent. Finally, Fueki
and Kawamoto (2008), using EU-KLEMS industry-level database, …nd that
the upsurge in productivity after the mid 1990s in Japan was speci…c to the
ICT production sector.
[Table 3 here]
U.S. Results are reported in table 4. The calibrated value of productiv-








return rate on capital. Productivity growth is now dominated by the invest-
ment speci…c technological change, mainly due to the contribution of the
technology embedded in the ICT assets, between 0.76% and 66%. This ICT
contribution widely exceeds that of the neutral change and the estimated
ICT contribution to productivity growth for the cases of Japan and Ger-
many. Neutral technological change contribution to productivity growth is
between 0.33% and 0.48%. Therefore, the investment-speci…c technological
change account for a fraction between 70% and 58% of the total productivity
growth. This is in line with the 58% result provided by Greenwood et al.
(1997). The contribution to productivity growth from non-ICT equipment
is very low, around 5%. The saving rate moves within an interval from 14%
to 11%. Greenwood et al. (1997) propose a discount factor for the U.S. of
￿ = 0:97, and an investment rate of 11:4%. Like in the case of Japan, our
exercise produces these rates when the after tax discount rate is assumed to
be 6-7%. Not surprisingly, the technological change decomposition replicates
the 58% result given by Greenwood et al. (1997) for a di¤erent period.
[Table 4 here]
Germany. Results are …nally reported in table 5. The calibrated value of
productivity growth accurately …ts the observed one. Productivity growth
is now dominated by the neutral technological change as in the case of
Japan but in a more dramatic way. Neutral technological change produces
increases in productivity of around 2%. Therefore, the neutral technical
change account for a fraction of 85% of productivity growth with investment-
speci…c technical change accounting for the rest 15%. The contribution of
ICT equipment is between 0.25% and 0.28%, whereas contribution from non-
ICT equipment is about 0.08%. The saving rate moves within an interval
from 13.3% to 16.7%. Bems and Hartelius (2006) estimate values for the
German discount factor of 0.95-0.96. Again, our exercise produces this rates
when the after tax discount rate is assumed to be between 6% and 7%.
[Table 5 here]
In light of these tables, there are four results that we would like to em-
phasize. First, neutral technological change dominates productivity growth
in Japan (70%) and Germany (85%) while investment speci…c technological
change accounts for a fraction of 60%-70% of the U.S. productivity growth.
This implies that the sources of long run productivity growth are very dif-








economies. It is important to note the di¤erences in the average productiv-
ity growth across countries during the sample period (see table 1). Average
productivity growth is higher in Japan and Germany than in the U.S. The
contribution to productivity growth from investment speci…c technological
change is around 0.32%-0.36% for Germany, 0.61%-0.70% for Japan and
0.66%-0.76% for the U.S. Another di¤erence is found in the contribution
from neutral technological change. In this case we obtain a value of around
1.7% for Japan, 2.0% for Germany and only a value of about 0.4% for the
U.S. This factor accounts for an important fraction of productivity growth
performance in Japan and Germany with respect to the U.S. economy during
the sample period.
Second, technology embedded in the ICT assets are the main source of
the investment-speci…c change for all three economies but with signi…cant
quantitative di¤erences across them. With only ICT investment-speci…c
technological change, productivity growth would have increased by 0.25%-
0.28% in Germany, 0.44%-0.50% in Japan and 0.61%-0.70% in the U.S.
Table 1 reported that productivity growth is declining in Japan, increasing
in the U.S. and stable in Germany, and table 2 reported that the U.S. has
invested in ICT assets more than Japan and Germany have done, while the
amount of technology embedded in the ICT assets is the highest one among
the three U.S. investment assets, as measured by the ￿0
is, i 2 fstr;nict;ictg.
This supports other results that make the ICT responsible in the upsurge
in the U.S. productivity growth during the nineties.
Third, the contribution to productivity growth from "traditional" non-
ICT equipment shows dramatic di¤erences across countries. Whereas this
contribution is about 0.06 percentage points for the U.S. and 0.08 percentage
points for Germany, in the case of Japan this …gure is around 0.18 percent-
age points. This implies that technological change associates with non-ICT
equipment is much larger in the Japanese economy than in the other two
countries. This is an important factor in explaining the larger productivity
growth in Japan as compared with Germany and the U.S.
Finally, when we compare our exercise with other calibrations, we see
that the model demands an after tax return rate of about 6-7% for all coun-
tries, a result consistent with a non-arbitrage condition under international
free capital mobility.
A conclusion derived from the previous results seems to indicate that the
U.S. was the leading economy in the new information and communication
era, followed by Japan. Yet, in order to study how speci…c technological
change has evolved over time, we repeat the previous analysis by splitting








tax rate of return of 6.5% for the three countries. Results are summarized
in table 6. If we pay attention to the contribution from total (ICT and
non-ICT) investment-speci…c technological change, during the period 1977-
2005, Japan was the leading country. For that period, average contribution
to productivity growth from investment speci…c technological change was
about 0.66% for Japan, 0.65% for the U.S. and 0.29% for Germany. On the
other hand, Japan has been the country with the larger average productivity
growth during the period. However, for the second period, 1995-2005, the
contribution from investment-speci…c technological change increases in the
U.S. and in Germany, but decreases in Japan with respect to the …rst period.
Our results are consistent with the ones presented by Fukao and Miya-
gawa (2007) for the three countries. These authors show that the U.S. has
experienced a very rapid increase in ICT capital after 1995. On the con-
trary, ICT capital in Japan in 2004 was less than twice as high as in 1995.
Jorgenson and Motohashi (2005) show that the contribution of ICT capital
in Japan declined during the …rst half of the 1990s, but rebounded strongly
after 1995. In our case, ICT contribution to productivity growth remains
constant, on average, between the periods 1977-1995 and 1995-2005 for the
U.S. economy, whereas it increased for the Japan and Germany economies.
In the U.S. we obtain that ICT contribution to productivity growth is sim-
ilar in both sub-periods, about 0.62%. Jorgenson and Motohashi (2005)
using a traditional growth accounting obtained that the contribution from
ICT to output growth is larger in the second subperiod compared with the
…rst one. Non-ICT contribution increases, from a 0.01 to 0.13 percentage
points.
Neutral technological change is the main source of productivity growth
for the three countries and accounting for about 70-80% of total produc-
tivity growth during 1995-2005. Comparing both subperiods of time, we
obtain that the contribution of neutral technological change to productivity
growth decreases in Japan, increases in the U.S. and remains almost con-
stant in Germany. This is consistent with the results obtained by Hayashi
and Prescott (2002) in which low productivity growth in Japan in the 1990s
is associated with the reduction in total factor productivity growth. Average
neutral technological change contribution is negative in the U.S. economy
during the period 1977-1995. This result is produced by the …rst years of
the sample period, in which TFP growth was negative. However, recovery










In this section we analyze the quantitative e¤ects of ‡uctuations from neutral
shocks and investment-speci…c shocks. The model developed in the previous
sections allows us to study the e¤ect of two additional types of investment-
speci…c technological shocks, associated to non-ICT equipment and ICT
equipment.
The three processes representing the motion of technology expressed in
(8) and (10) can be …ltered and written as
lnQi;t = ￿i;0 + ￿i;1t + ￿i lnQi;t￿1 + "i;t; (35)
with ￿i;0 = (1 ￿ ￿i)ai + ￿i ln(￿i);
￿i;1 = (1 ￿ ￿i)ln(￿i);
given ln(￿i). The process for the neutral technological change has an anal-
ogous obvious representation. A value for f￿i;￿ig is obtained using a max-
imum likelihood estimator. Results are shown in table 7.
[Table 7 here]
We next study how these shocks a¤ect the economy around the balanced
growth path, using the impulse response functions from a log-linear version
of previous model. The neutral shock, "A;t, has an immediate impact on
output by raising the total factor productivity, At. Its short-run e¤ect on
consumption is always positive due to the income e¤ect. A non neutral shock
a¤ects the after-tax real rate of return that implies an intertemporal substi-
tution in consumption from (16), and a substitution between consumption
and leisure. Output is therefore a¤ected in the current period through the
impact on labor supply and on investment decisions.
Instead, a non-neutral shock in asset i 2 fnict;ictg only a¤ects the
marginal product of i. This induces a substitution in the portfolio of assets:
a higher investment in asset i and a disinvestment in the remaining ones. The
net e¤ect on total savings depends on the substitution e¤ect and the portfolio
composition. Total savings also increase due to the rise in returns to labor
and the increases in labor supply (or a reduction in leisure). In the following
and subsequent periods, a positive non-neutral shock in asset i 2 fnict;ictg
impulses the marginal product of own and the remaining factors in the
production function, which implies the existence of a complementary e¤ect.
Labor productivity increases in response to a neutral shock (output in-
creases more than hours worked). But a non-neutral shock can have a neg-








in i 2 fnict;ictg, there is an increase in investment in asset i and in total in-
vestment that produces a decrease in consumption. Given the wage, leisure
must also decrease. This produces a rise in hours worked. Note that ￿L < 1
is the elasticity of output with respect to labor. A one percent increase in
the amount of hours worked produces a less than proportional increase on
output of ￿L percent.6
Figures 3 to 5 plot the response of productivity growth, consumption
growth and investment growth, respectively, to a one standard deviation
impulse in the three shocks. For each country we compute four impulse-
response functions, corresponding to (the growth rates of) non-ICT equip-
ment, ICT equipment and total investment, in terms of the three technolog-
ical shocks. The impulse response …gures show deviations with respect to
the balanced growth rates of the variables.
In the three economies, labor productivity increases in response to a pos-
itive neutral technological shock. The highest impact occurs in the …rst pe-
riod and declines thereafter. The immediate response is similar in the three
countries: labor productivity growth increases by 0.75 percentage points in
response to a neutral shock of one standard deviation. Interestingly, speci…c
technological shocks have a negative impact e¤ect on productivity growth,
showing a hump-shaped impulse response (Figure 3). A technological shock
to ICT and non-ICT equipment has a negative impact on productivity but it
is negligible and it becomes positive thereafter. Concerning the persistency
of these shocks, all shocks have a cumulative positive e¤ect on productivity
in the medium and the long term. In quantitative terms, the largest e¤ect
is observed for the Japanese economy.
Figure 4 presents the impulse-response for consumption growth. Con-
sumption growth increases in response to a positive neutral shock. However,
non-neutral shocks induce a suddenly decrease in consumption growth, pro-
voked by the positive impact on investment growth but the e¤ect turns out
positive afterwards, showing also a hump-shaped impulse-response. Figure
5 shows the impulse-responses for investment growth. Neutral technological
shock provokes an immediate positive response of total investment growth
above the steady state growth rate but thereafter the e¤ect turns out nega-
tive for some periods with a total investment growth rate below the steady
state value. A non-ICT technological shock has a negative impact e¤ect on
structures investment growth
6Miyagawa, Sakuragawa and Takizawa (2006) using a VAR approach with Japanese
…rm-level data …nd that a positive technology shock results in a reduction of labor input








The most interesting result is the response of ICT equipment investment
growth and non-ICT equipment investment growth. On the one hand, the
immediate impact of a shock on asset i moves decisions to invest in this asset:
the weight in the portfolio of asset i increases and decreases the weight of
the remaining ones. However, this e¤ect reverts in the next period, indicat-
ing that the di¤erent capital assets are complementary in the short-run, in
spite of the rivalry existing among di¤erent capital assets in the investment
process. On the other hand, the e¤ect of a non-ICT technological shock
on ICT equipment investment growth and the e¤ect of a ICT technological
shock on non-ICT equipment investment growth, are in both cases negligi-
ble. This implies that there is no substitution e¤ect between the two types
of capital equipment given a speci…c shock to each one. Finally, a neutral
technological shock has a very small e¤ect on ICT and non-ICT equipment
investment growth.
Table 8 reports the variance decomposition of productivity, consump-
tion and investment. It is worth mentioning that most of the variability
of productivity, around 90% for the three countries, is accounted for by
the neutral shock in the short run. In the medium and long run, neutral
shocks is responsible of about 80% of productivity variability in the U.S.
and about 75% in Germany. In Japan, the non neutral shocks account for a
fraction of 40% of this variance in the medium and the long term.7 With re-
gards to consumption decisions, most of this variability is due to the neutral
shock. However, investment decisions on structures are mainly explained by
a shock to non-ICT equipment. The variability of ICT investment is mainly
explained by shocks to the ICT, whereas variability of non-ICT investment
is explained by a shock to both structures and non-ICT technical change.
Total investment variability is mainly explained by neutral technological
shocks and shocks to structures.
Our results contrast with those found for the U.S. economy in two recent
articles, Fisher (2006) and Justiniano and Primiceri (2008). Fisher (2006)
proposes a set of identifying conditions for the two technology shocks. The
investment-speci…c shock is found to have a crucial role in accounting for the
‡uctuations of both hours and output. Fischer (2006) assumes that both
forms of technical progress follow a random walk with a drift. This assump-
tion is crucial for his identifying conditions and makes his …ndings di¤er
from ours. Indeed, when we assume a trend stationary process the e¤ects
7Braun and Shioji (2007) estimate a SVAR model showing that investment-speci…c









of a shock on technology tend to die out over time. Justiniano and Prim-
iceri (2008) estimate a DSGE model to analyze the di¤erent sources of U.S.
‡uctuations: shocks to technology, shocks to preferences, …scal shocks and
nominal shocks. They do not use quality adjusted investment prices to con-
struct a proxy measure of investment-speci…c technological shock. Instead,
the model is estimated taking all these shocks as unobservable. Their main
…nding is that the investment-speci…c technological shock can account for
most of the bulk of U.S. output ‡uctuations. While their approach is econo-
metric where the structural shocks are subject to time varying volatility,
ours is a calibration exercise.
[Tables 7 and 8 and …gures 3-5 about here]
6 Concluding remarks
This paper investigates the contribution of di¤erent sources of technologi-
cal progress to productivity growth in three leading world economies, i.e.,
Japan, Germany and the United States. We use a dynamic general equilib-
rium growth model with investment-speci…c technological progress, which
allows us to decompose productivity growth into three di¤erent sources
of technological progress: neutral technological change and two di¤erent
investment-speci…c technological change. This distinction is crucial as we
want to focus on quantifying the importance of ICT in explaining di¤er-
ences in productivity growth across the three economies. We …nd that the
ICT equipment, in spite of the fact that it represents a small fraction of
total capital used by the economy, explain a large fraction of productivity
growth.
The results obtained from the calibration of the model suggest that, in
the long-run, the sources of productivity growth are di¤erent across the three
countries. Investment-speci…c technological change is more important in the
U.S. than in Japan or Germany. As long as the U.S. economy is an inten-
sive user of the ICT, these di¤erences are mainly due to the technological
progress embedded in these capital assets. On the other hand, the contribu-
tion from neutral technological change is much more important in Japan and
Germany than in the U.S. This source accounts for a large fraction of pro-
ductivity growth in the Japanese and the German economies. This implies
that di¤erences in long swings of productivity growth can be attributed to
the relative importance of both type of ‡uctuations. Additionally, we obtain








portant role in the Japanese productivity growth, whereas its contribution
in Germany and in the U.S. is more modest.
Our results indicate that the U.S. is the leading economy in terms of
productivity growth derived from ICT equipment and also seems to provide
an "optimistic" rather than a "pessimistic" view of the Japanese economy,
showing a better performance compared to the German economy. Those re-
sults are consistent with the projections of Jorgenson and Motohashi (2005)
in which labor productivity growth will be similar for Japan and the U.S.,
but with output growth larger in the U.S., due to the slower growth of the
labor input in the Japanese economy.
Finally, when we have explored the short run implications of the di¤erent
shocks to productivity growth, we …nd that most of the deviations from
the balanced growth path are caused by the neutral shock in the three
countries. Hence, there are not important di¤erences among these three
economies when we move our focus from the long term to the short term
analysis. Having a look at the variance decomposition analysis suggests
that a transitory shock to investment-speci…c technological progress causes
a minor impact on the growth of productivity from its balanced growth
path, provided that the bulk of these short run swings are motivated by the
neutral progress.
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A Tables and …gures
Table 1: Average productivity growth
rates 1977-2005
Japan U.S.A. Germany
1977-1980 4.09 -0.26 2.91
1980-1990 3.79 0.95 2.17
1990-2000 2.24 2.07 2.88
2000-2005 2.08 2.10 1.44
1977-2005 2.90 1.44 2.37
Table 2: Parameters values
Japan U.S.A. Germany
g 1.0302 1.0144 1.0237
L=(NH) 0.3530 0.3660 0.2998
￿L 0.6387 0.7248 0.7412
￿str 0.0286 0.0277 0.0310
￿nict 0.1261 0.1284 0.1259
￿ict 0.2209 0.1933 0.1813
!str 0.3747 0.3545 0.3783
!nict 0.4795 0.3930 0.4717
!ict 0.1458 0.2525 0.1500
￿nict 1.0055 1.0043 1.0046
￿ict 1.0613 1.0916 1.0914
￿c 0.0510 0.0470 0.1130
￿` 0.2510 0.2300 0.3390








Table 3: Japan, 1977-2005
After tax return rate, (g=￿ ￿ 1) ￿ 100 4% 5% 6% 7%
Observed productivity, g 2.97 2.97 2.97 2.97
Calibrated productivity, (a)+(b) 2.32 2.33 2.33 2.34
Neutral change (a) 1.63 1.66 1.70 1.72
Speci…c change (b)=(b1)+(b2) 0.70 0.66 0.64 0.61
NICT equipment (b1) 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18
ICT equipment (b2) 0.50 0.48 0.46 0.44
Discount factor, ￿ 0.9906 0.9811 0.9719 0.9628
Investment rate, (1 ￿ C=Y ) ￿ 100 20.26 18.60 17.19 15.98
Cost shares
Structures, ￿str 0.1441 0.1516 0.1579 0.1633
NICT equipment, ￿nict 0.1676 0.1627 0.1586 0.1551
ICT equipment, ￿ict 0.0496 0.0470 0.0448 0.0429
Decomposition of technological change
Neutral 69.98 71.44 72.68 73.74
Investment-speci…c 30.02 28.55 27.31 26.26
Table 4: U.S.A., 1977-2005
After tax return rate, (g=￿ ￿ 1) ￿ 100 4% 5% 6% 7%
Observed productivity, g 1.43 1.43 1.43 1.43
Calibrated productivity, (a)+(b) 1.09 1.11 1.12 1.14
Neutral change (a) 0.33 0.39 0.43 0.48
Speci…c change (b)=(b1)+(b2) 0.76 0.72 0.68 0.66
NICT equipment (b1) 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05
ICT equipment (b2) 0.70 0.66 0.63 0.61
Discount factor, ￿ 0.9754 0.9661 0.9570 0.9481
Investment rate, (1 ￿ C=Y ) ￿ 100 14.10 12.91 11.91 11.05
Cost shares
Structures, ￿str 0.1199 0.1261 0.1312 0.1357
NICT equipment, ￿nict 0.0972 0.0942 0.0916 0.0894
ICT equipment, ￿ict 0.0581 0.0550 0.0523 0.0501
Decomposition of technological change
Neutral 30.24 34.98 38.85 42.09








Table 5: Germany, 1977-2005
After tax return rate, (g=￿ ￿ 1) ￿ 100 4% 5% 6% 7%
Observed productivity, g 2.38 2.38 2.38 2.38
Calibrated productivity, (a)+(b) 2.37 2.37 2.37 2.38
Neutral change (a) 2.00 2.02 2.04 2.05
Speci…c change (b)=(b1)+(b2) 0.36 0.35 0.33 0.32
NICT equipment (b1) 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07
ICT equipment (b2) 0.28 0.27 0.25 0.25
Discount factor, ￿ 0.9847 0.9753 0.9661 0.9571
Investment rate, (1 ￿ C=Y ) ￿ 100 16.70 15.39 14.27 13.30
Cost shares
Structures, ￿str 0.1059 0.1106 0.1146 0.1181
NICT equipment, ￿nict 0.1141 0.1110 0.1084 0.1061
ICT equipment, ￿ict 0.0350 0.0334 0.0320 0.0308
Decomposition of technological change
Neutral 84.65 85.32 85.89 86.38
Investment-speci…c 15.34 14.67 14.11 13.32
Table 6: Contribution to growth, 1977-1995 versus 1995-2005
Japan USA Germany
77-95 95-05 77-95 95-05 77-95 95-05
Observed productivity, g 3.41 2.19 0.92 2.28 2.50 2.28
Calibrated productivity, (a+b) 2.70 1.68 0.36 2.42 2.47 2.35
Neutral change (a) 2.04 1.15 -0.27 1.67 2.18 1.93
Speci…c change (b=b1+b2) 0.66 0.53 0.63 0.74 0.29 0.42
NICT equipment (b1) 0.21 0.10 0.01 0.13 0.11 0.04
ICT equipment (b2) 0.45 0.43 0.62 0.62 0.18 0.38
Percentage
Neutral 0.76 0.69 - 0.69 0.88 0.82














































8Note: We estimate expresions (35) using maximum likelihood. Numbers into brackets
below the ￿
0
is parameters represent the standard deviations. Greenwood et al. (2000) for
the U.S. economy estimate a parameter of 0.64 for equipment technological change. Pakko
(2005), using a similar model for the US, estimates a parameter of 0.945 for the neutral
technological change and a value of 0.941 for the equipment technological change. These








Table 8: Variance decomposition of growth rates
Japan USA Germany
"nict "ict "A "nict "ict "A "nict "ict "A
Time Productivity growth
1 0.30 0.00 99.69 0.03 0.00 99.96 0.09 0.00 99.90
5 19.95 10.73 69.31 3.66 5.25 91.08 4.56 3.29 92.14
Time Consumption growth
1 9.66 0.03 90.30 1.61 0.04 98.34 2.98 0.16 96.85
5 27.53 10.20 62.26 4.55 3.67 91.78 10.06 4.57 85.36
Time Investment growth of Structures
1 79.17 7.31 13.51 45.16 12.01 42.81 43.82 7.03 49.14
5 83.93 9.24 6.82 56.43 18.85 24.71 57.31 10.22 32.46
Time Investment growth of Non-ICT
1 99.36 0.00 0.63 98.04 0.02 1.93 97.54 0.09 2.36
5 99.55 0.06 0.38 98.75 0.11 1.13 98.23 0.21 1.55
Time Investment growth of ICT
1 0.01 99.93 0.05 0.02 99.65 0.32 0.08 99.83 0.09
5 0.05 99.91 0.03 0.04 99.75 0.19 0.11 99.81 0.06
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